transit vehicles themselves may contribute to externalities such as congestion and pollution, and their passengers generate external costs on each other via crowding (Kraus 1991) or increased boarding and alighting time. Fourth, automobile externalities are partly internalized through fuel taxes. And finally, altering the subsidy for one mode will cause substitution effects across modes and times of day, with secondary effects on economic efficiency due to the many distortions from optimality conditions in the system. Several studies have estimated optimal transit prices, focusing on one or both of the primary rationales just mentioned and usually just one location. None of them encompass all of the additional complications identified above. In fact, existing estimates of optimal transit prices (given current road prices) vary enormously, from zero to more than 100 percent of operating costs, providing a confusing guide as to whether current fare subsidies should be preserved, expanded, or eliminated.
1 It is difficult to discern the reasons for the strikingly diverse results because the studies apply to different regions and years, they account for different factors, they make different assumptions about transit agency response, not all of them distinguish time of day, and some use simplified analytical models while others use less transparent but more sophisticated computational models. Furthermore, assumptions about agency and travel responses that may be reasonable at current prices may not be at very different prices; thus, for the purpose of drawing robust qualitative results, it may be better to focus on the direction of welfare effects from small changes to existing prices rather than place too much emphasis on fully optimized prices.
This paper provides a general framework for evaluating existing fare subsidies and potential pricing reforms. It does so by developing a single analytical model that incorporates all the factors just described, then derives formulas for optimal subsidies for bus and rail at peak and off-peak periods and calculates the welfare effects from incrementally adjusting current fare subsidies. These formulas clarify the contribution of all underlying parameters and can be 1 For London, Glaister and Lewis (1978, Table 4 , line 3b) estimate optimal rail and bus fares at about 50 to 60 percent of marginal operating costs. For the San Francisco Bay Area and for Pittsburgh, Viton (1983) finds optimal fares to be virtually zero. Winston and Shirley (1998) find quite the opposite for the United States as a whole, with optimal bus and rail fares covering 84 percent and 97 percent of marginal operating costs, respectively. For a prototype Belgian city, De Borger et al. (1996) estimate optimal transit fares are 50 to 114 percent of average agency costs, depending on how service frequency adjusts to passenger demand. For Brussels, Van Dender and Proost (2004) estimate optimal transit fares to be nearly zero in peak periods and about double current fares in off-peak periods. Two recent studies of Washington, D.C., by Winston and Maheshri (2007) and Nelson et al. (2007) , estimate net total benefits from transit but with conflicting results. Insofar as possible, we relate our findings to this previous literature in Section 4.3.
empirically implemented in a spreadsheet. Following an extensive compilation and estimation of parameter values, we apply the formulas to three large but very different metropolitan areas:
Washington, Los Angeles, and London. Our analysis includes vehicle capital costs (which can be varied fairly easily) but not infrastructure investments; thus, following previous optimal transit pricing literature, we explore how best to use existing infrastructure without worrying about recovering sunk capital costs.
The most striking finding is that, in almost all cases, extending fare subsidies beyond 50 percent of operating costs-often well beyond-is welfare improving at the margin across modes, periods, and cities. And these findings are generally robust to plausible alternative assumptions about parameters and agency behavior. The main reasons why large subsides are welfare improving are the two classic ones. However, the relative importance of these two rationales varies across different cases and assumptions. We find big gains from diverting auto traffic, especially during peak periods. Furthermore, to the extent that service is increased in response to additional passenger demand, scale economies arising from reduced user costs of wait and access are usually significant, especially for bus and for off-peak service. And to the extent that transit vehicle occupancy is increased instead, savings in operating costs typically outweigh any extra costs from crowding or increasing vehicle size.
Do our results imply that existing operating deficits should continue to be financed through general taxation, rather than being reduced through substantial increases in passenger fares and reduced service levels?
One counterargument is that we ignore the broader efficiency costs from financing operating deficits through distortionary taxes. However, as emphasized in the literature on environmental tax shifts (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder 2002; Parry and Bento 2001) , there are important counteracting effects on tax distortions elsewhere in the economy to the extent that lower transportation costs encourage more economic activity. We discuss tax distortions in Section 5; based on a rough calculation there, the net impact of these distortions on optimal subsidies appears to be moderate.
Another issue is to what extent our results may carry over to urban transit systems other than the three studied here. Marginal congestion costs are likely to be lower in most other cities, but as discussed in our sensitivity analysis, optimal fare subsidies can still be substantial because of other factors. A more definitive answer awaits a detailed parameter assessment for other cases.
Probably the most important qualification is that we do not explicitly model the potentially lax incentives for cost minimization inherent in a publicly provided service. As shown later, our general framework and results still apply to more efficiently managed transit systems with lower operating costs. However, there is evidence that subsidy programs themselves cause cost-inflation through excessive compensation, misuse of high-skilled labor in low-skill tasks, and inefficient use of labor and capital (Winston and Shirley 1998; Small and Gomez-Ibanez 1999, sect. 3.3) . One response to this problem might be to privatize transit systems while retaining some subsidies; but an alternative would be to switch to a fixed subsidy per passenger mile (by mode and period) and require the agency to cover the remainder of its operating costs through its pricing structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the analytical model and derives key formulas; Section 3 discusses baseline data; Section 4 presents the main quantitative results and sensitivity analysis; and Section 5 concludes and elaborates on the qualifications.
Analytical Model
We develop a model of urban passenger travel by auto, rail, and bus at different times of day, where transit user costs depend on congestion, transit frequency, route density, and vehicle crowding. Travel also produces pollution and accident externalities, some of which are internalized by fuel taxes. The government chooses transit characteristics and fares subject to a budget constraint, while agents optimize over travel choices taking externalities and transit characteristics as given.
Model Assumptions
(i) User utility. The representative agent has preferences defined as follows:
where all variables are in per capita terms. In (1a), X is the quantity of a numeraire or general consumption good; M is subutility from passenger miles traveled; Γ is a generalized (non-money) cost of travel; and Z is disutility from pollution and traffic accident externalities. , the average number of passengers in a bus or train:
where V ij is total vehicle miles. Second is the load factor, l ij , defined as the fraction of a vehicle's passenger capacity n ij that is occupied:
Third is the average service frequency, f ij , along each bus or rail transit line:
where D ij is route density, measured as total route miles within the fixed service area.
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These variables determine the per-mile travel characteristics in (1d) as follows:
where α B > 1 is the contribution of a bus to congestion relative to that of a car, or the "passenger 2 We exclude possible externalities from oil dependence because they are difficult to define; insofar as they have been quantified (for example, NRC 2002 put them at 12 cents per gallon of gasoline), incorporating them would make very little difference to our results, as can be seen from our discussion of sensitivity with respect to global warming damages in Section 5. Also, some of the costs of oil dependence are domestic rather than worldwide, and so including all of them would be inconsistent with the worldwide perspective adopted in estimating global warming costs. 3 We hold trip length constant, so variations in M ij arise from variations in the number of trips. 
The quantities ρ k are the (marginal) dollar values of in-vehicle time, waiting time, access time, and crowding, which are taken as fixed (although it is not indicated by the notation, we allow these values to vary by time of day.) Thus is a generalized price, including both money and nonmoney costs per mile; agents equate the marginal benefit from passenger miles to this generalized price for each mode and time period. From (5), (6), and (1) we obtain the demand functions and indirect utility (denoted by ~): Although these assumptions represent a neutral case, 8 we discuss later the implications of relaxing them. From (6a) and (10) we can express the generalized user price as
In practice, fuel tax revenues are earmarked for road and transit infrastructure projects; accounting for this could affect our results very slightly, to the extent that the social benefit per dollar of infrastructure spending differs from unity. 8 For example, if the agency overinvests in service frequency relative to route density, then using (10a) and data on wait costs will underestimate (unobserved) marginal access costs, and vice versa if there is underinvestment in service frequency. Without reliable data on access costs, we cannot say which of these two cases might be the more likely.
Condition (10a) ignores fixed costs of additional routes and so overstates the optimal route density for rail. On the other hand, there is evidence that rail lines have been built that are not economically justified, and thus current route density may also exceed optimal route density. Furthermore, off-peak route density can be adjusted even in the short run by making some lines peak-only. To analyze this more thoroughly, we could omit (10a) for peak service and assume instead that D Pj is fixed at its current value; this would require empirical estimates of
Following an increase in demand for passenger miles, we assume that a (constant) fraction ε V of it is accommodated through increased vehicle miles (of which the increases in service frequency and route density are chosen to satisfy (10a)) and fraction 1−ε V through higher occupancy of transit vehicles (with the increase in vehicle size and load factors chosen to satisfy (10b)). 
Welfare and Optimal Subsidy Formulas
In (11), the quantity is the marginal demand shift for mode ij induced by a peak-rail price change. Our preference assumptions imply that and for ij ≠ PR; that is, peak-rail ridership goes up following a decrease in the fare, diverting ridership away from autos and other transit.
The other expressions in (11) are defined as follows:
; ; 
MC
Revisiting (11), each term shows a component of welfare change due to shifting from other modes and/or time periods into peak rail. The "marginal cost/price gap" term shows that welfare from a price reduction is reduced to the extent that the fare for peak rail already falls short of the corresponding marginal supply cost. The "net scale" term indicates that welfare from a fare reduction is larger to the extent that scale economies from increased peak-rail use outweigh the extra user costs due to crowding and the extra user and agency costs from increased occupancy of peak-rail vehicles. The "externality" term shows that welfare increases insofar as pollution, accident, and congestion externalities from auto travel are reduced, although this is partly offset if there are similar externalities from peak rail itself. Finally, the "other transit" term indicates that welfare improves to the extent that passengers are diverted from other transit modes or times of day whose fares fall short of the corresponding marginal social cost; that marginal social cost includes incremental supply cost, occupancy cost, and externalities, less incremental benefits from scale economies.
(ii) Optimized transit subsidies. Equation (11) gives us all we need to compute marginal welfare change from increasing an existing subsidy. If we want to go further and find the optimal subsidy, we can do so by setting (11) (11) to zero and is the modal diversion ratio, or fraction of increased travel by peak rail that comes from reduced travel by model j in period i. Equation (13) implies that the optimal subsidy per passenger mile is positive to the extent that (a) marginal supply cost is below average operating cost; (b) scale economies from increasing passenger miles outweigh costs from increased occupancy; (c) externality gains from diverting auto travel exceed the marginal external costs of the increased peak-rail travel; and (d) travel is diverted from other transit for which the overall social cost per passenger mile exceeds the fare.
As already discussed, equation (13) may be reliable only when conditions are not too far from those currently observed. However, we found that attempts to simultaneously optimize all transit fares sometimes led to drastic changes in ridership and consequently in transit characteristics. Therefore in the empirical simulations presented here, we optimize over a single transit price while setting prices of competing transit modes and periods at their currently observed levels. In other words, we ask what a given fare should be, given the possibly nonoptimal levels of other fares.
(iii) Functional forms. We assume that marginal congestion costs and are constant because road traffic changes only moderately in our policy simulations; we also assume that and are constant but that and vary as discussed in Section 3.
Passenger travel demands are assumed to have constant elasticities with respect to own generalized price, and to adjust to other prices according to the modal diversion elasticities already defined. Writing this out for changes in the price of peak rail, we obtain
where a bar denotes an initial (currently observed) value, and is the elasticity of demand for peak rail with respect to its generalized price. Differentiating (14a), we obtain explicitly the dependence of peak-rail demand on its money price, holding the generalized prices of other M dp dq dp
is the total effect of a one-cent-per-mile increase in the passenger fare on the generalized cost of peak-rail travel, through equation (10c); that effect is greater than one cent because the reduction in peak-rail vehicle miles increases wait and access costs per mile (assuming ε PR PR dp dq / V >0), which magnifies the depressing effect on ridership. Table 2 ; alternative assumptions with possible significance for our results are discussed later.
(i) System aggregates and agency adjustment. The Washington and Los Angeles transit systems each carry nearly 2 billion passenger miles a year across all modes and times of day; this transit usage represents 4.3 percent of total passenger miles (auto plus transit) in Washington but only 1.3 percent in Los Angeles. In London, the transit system carries more than 8 billion passenger miles a year, or 21.7 percent of all passenger travel. For Washington, passenger miles by rail are more than three times those for bus, while the opposite applies to Los Angeles, with its extensive bus but limited rail network. For London, the two modes are closer in size, with passenger miles for rail exceeding those for bus by 29 percent. Average transit vehicle occupancies are broadly comparable across the cities but are 26 to 76 percent greater during peak than during off-peak periods. Train occupancy is around 5 to 10 times that for bus.
We assume that transit agencies meet a 1 percent increase in passenger demand through a 0.67 percent increase in vehicle miles and a 0.33 percent increase in vehicle occupancy, or ε V = 0.67. As explained in Appendix A, this rule would apply, under certain simplifications, if the agency optimally trades off vehicle miles and occupancy and if wait and access times are inversely proportional to frequency and route density, respectively. 10 We consider other values for ε V in our sensitivity analysis.
(ii) Operating costs, marginal supply costs, and fares. Our cost data enable us to compute the parameters in (8). They imply that average operating costs per vehicle mile are around 60 to 100 percent larger in the peak than in the off-peak period. Peak costs are greater because they include vehicle capital costs, higher unit labor costs due to irregular work hours, and in the case of bus, additional costs incurred because it takes longer to drive a mile on congested roads.
However, the peak/off-peak discrepancies in the average operating costs per passenger mile are much smaller (approximately zero for rail) because of the different vehicle occupancies.
The resulting figures for average operating costs vary from 30 to 103 cents per passenger mile across modes, periods, and time of day. For the U.S. cities, average operating costs per passenger mile are generally higher for bus than for rail, particularly for Washington, where bus occupancies are lower than in Los Angeles. The opposite applies for London. There, the marginal cost of supplying passenger miles, from equation (12a), is two-thirds of the average costs in the case of bus and only 60 percent of average costs in the case of rail, because ε V = 0.67 and 10 percent of average rail costs is assumed fixed.
Passenger fares are 20 to 25 cents per mile for Washington and London; in Los Angeles they are only 14 cents per mile for bus and 8 cents per mile for rail. 11 Fare subsidies, defined as , are substantial and exceed 50 percent or more of average operating costs in almost all cases; subsidies are especially large for Los Angeles rail (82 to 83 percent), with its unusually low fares, and also for Washington bus (73 to 81 percent), which has typical fares but relatively low occupancies.
Average wait times at transit stops are estimated from service frequency. We assume that when vehicles are less than 15 minutes apart, travelers arrive at random, so the waittime elasticity is one; but that as the time between vehicles exceeds 15 minutes, an increasing fraction of travelers use a timetable, thereby lowering the elasticity (see Appendix B).
Expressing wait times on a per mile basis and multiplying by the value of wait time ρ W (assumed from the empirical literature to be 60 to 80 percent of the market wage, depending on time period) give initial wait costs that vary from 5 to 72 cents per passenger mile. Wait times are much larger during the off-peak period; they are also larger for bus than for rail.
There is less empirical basis for gauging crowding and access time elasticities; we have assumed location-specific values as explained in Appendix B. At least when equation (10) applies, our results are not very sensitive to alternative assumptions about these elasticities.
(iv) Marginal benefit from scale economies and marginal occupancy costs. These are computed from (12b) using our parameters for wait costs and vehicle capital costs.
Because of greater wait times at transit stops, marginal scale economies are larger for bus than for rail and for off-peak than for peak travel; however, for bus travel, wait times are less responsive to service frequency in off-peak periods when some people are using schedules, which narrows the discrepancy in scale economies across time of day for that mode. Overall, marginal scale economies vary between 3 and 34 cents per mile across modes, periods, and cities. Increased occupancy costs per additional passenger mile counteract some, though usually not all, scale economies at peak period; however, they are zero in the off-peak period because all vehicle capital costs (and hence crowding costs) are attributed to the peak.
(v) Externalities. Marginal external costs per passenger mile for autos are dominated by congestion; that is, the net impact of pollution and accident externalities and fuel taxes is relatively modest. This is particularly the case for London, where marginal congestion costs are 103 and 37 cents per passenger mile in the peak and off-peak periods, respectively, but global and local pollution and accident costs are "only" about 4 cents per passenger mile, with offsetting fuel taxes of 6 to 9 cents per mile. Perhaps the most contentious assumption is that global warming costs amount to less than half of one cent per mile, though that is what most mainstream estimates imply; even increasing our estimate several-fold would still leave pollution costs small relative to congestion costs.
12 For the U.S. cities, overall external costs for auto are 25 to 31 cents and 6 to 9 cents per passenger mile, respectively, in the peak and off-peak periods;
figures for gridlocked London are much higher, at 99 and 35 cents, respectively. /dp ij as embodied within (14c).
Modal diversion ratios are based on available evidence and our own judgment (Appendix B). We assume that 60 to 85 percent of increased passenger mileage in response to lower fares comes from diverted auto travel for U.S. cities, and 40 to 50 percent for London, where autos account for a smaller share of passenger travel (Table 2) . We assume that 10 percent of extra travel on one transit mode comes from the same mode in the other period, and that the fraction from the other transit mode within the same time period is 5 percent for Los Angeles, 10 percent for Washington, and 30 percent for London.
Results

Baseline Results
The upper part of Table 3 shows estimates of the marginal welfare effect of a one-centper-mile reduction in the passenger fare, starting either at the current subsidy level or at a subsidy level equal to 50 percent of operating costs. Results are expressed in U.S. cents per passenger mile (at 2004 price levels).
The most striking result is that, with the exception of Washington peak-period bus, the marginal welfare effect of increasing the subsidy is positive across modes, periods, and cities starting at subsidy levels of 50 percent. Most of these marginal welfare gains are between about 0.2 and 0.6 cents per passenger mile per one-cent increase in subsidy. Even starting at current subsidy levels, which are typically well above 50 percent, the marginal welfare effects from further lowering transit fares are positive in 9 of 12 cases.
The reasons for these results can be discerned in the figures for individual components of marginal welfare at current subsidies (in the top part of Table 3 ). In all cases the marginal supply cost exceeds the fare at current prices, causing an incremental welfare loss from this source between 0.04 and 1.27 cents per passenger mile. However, in almost all cases this loss is outweighed by incremental welfare gains from the combination of net scale economies and externality benefits. Washington peak-period bus is the exception here because of its especially high marginal supply cost. Welfare effects from interactions among transit modes play a reinforcing but generally more modest role, given that most of the extra passengers on transit were previously driving.
Although the contributions of net scale economies and externalities to marginal welfare vary considerably, one or the other is important in almost every case. In 7 of the 12 cases, net scale economies are substantial-between 0.3 and 1.5 cents per passenger mile. Net scale economies are larger for bus than for rail, and larger for off-peak than for peak travel; the reasons for this, already mentioned, are amplified by the greater price-responsiveness of passenger demand (and hence of service frequency or route density) in the cases of bus and of off-peak travel. Only for peak-rail service in London are scale economies fully offset by higher occupancy costs, presumably reflecting London's famous subway crowding and its already high service frequency and density. As for externalities, most of the welfare gains come from reducing road congestion; those gains are especially large in Los Angeles and London, except for off-peak bus service.
14 The lower part of Table 3 shows the optimal subsidy level, expressed as a percentage of average operating costs per passenger mile. We find that optimal fare subsidies are 68 to 90 percent or more of average operating costs in 11 of 12 cases; Washington peak bus is the exception, where the optimal subsidy is "only" 44 percent. Again, some combination of net scale economies and diversion of auto externalities explains a major part of the optimal subsidy. The gap between the average and marginal cost of expanding passenger miles, due mostly to the savings in agency costs when occupancy rather than service frequency is increased, also plays a consistently important role.
Sensitivity Analysis
To explore how robust the above results are, we first vary parameters with potential significance for marginal welfare effects and then consider different assumptions about agency adjustment. Table 4 reports results from varying travel demand elasticities, congestion costs, the value of wait time at transit stops, the costs of increasing vehicle size, and per unit operating costs. In all cases welfare effects change in the expected direction. For example, when travel is more price responsive, the size of the welfare effect is magnified but the sign is unaffected, while lower unit operating costs lower the absolute value of the marginal cost/price gap, implying a larger overall welfare effect. 15 For some perturbations welfare effects change noticeably. For example, off-peak bus is sensitive to the value of wait time through its effect on scale economies, and peak rail in Los Angeles and London is sensitive to congestion costs. Nonetheless, our basic qualitative finding-that marginal welfare effects are positive at current subsidies in the majority of cases-is unaffected. Even starting at 50 percent subsidies (results not shown), our sensitivity results show that Washington peak bus is the only case with negative marginal welfare, with two small exceptions when agency operating costs are half again as high as in our baseline.
14 In the case of Los Angeles, all components of our estimated welfare changes are compounded by existing low fares because we assume constant-elasticity demand functions, such that a unit fare change is a larger percentage of the existing fare.
15 For this simulation we adjust fares to keep subsidies constant as a proportion of operating costs.
In Table 5 we compare two scenarios: an increase in demand for passenger miles is met entirely through increased vehicle supply (ε V = 1.0), versus half of the increase is met through increased vehicle miles and half through increased occupancy (ε V = 0.5). Marginal welfare effects are generally lower in the former case than in our baseline, and larger in the latter. This follows because the agency costs of accommodating extra passenger miles through more vehicle miles, net of scale economies, is greater than the agency and user costs of accommodating extra passengers through higher occupancy 16 (London off-peak bus is the lone exception). But again, our basic result-that subsidies of at least 50 percent of operating costs are welfare improving at the margin-is robust. The main reason is that much of the change in agency supply costs per passenger mile, as we vary ε V , is offset by changes in net scale economies, as can be seen from the decomposition of welfare effects in the table.
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Finally, suppose that the agency does not suboptimize over route density/service frequency and vehicle size/load factor, and thus the conditions in (10) no longer hold. Suppose, for example, that service frequency is excessive relative to route density. In this case marginal wait costs will underestimate marginal access costs, and correspondingly, the marginal benefit from scale economies in (12b) will be understated by a factor of
, where is the fraction of marginal changes in vehicle miles that are met through increased density rather than increased service frequency. If, for illustration, =0.5 and marginal access costs exceed marginal wait costs by 50 percent, then will be understated by 25 percent. However, we have already illustrated the effect of different values for when we varied the wait cost parameter in Table 4 , and for the most part, results were only moderately sensitive to different values. Similarly, relaxing suboptimization over vehicle size and crowding has essentially the same effect as varying the cost of increasing vehicle size, which again does not modify our main qualitative conclusions.
That is, the increase in the "marginal cost/price gap" component of MW, as ε V is lowered from 1.0 to 0.5 in Table   5 , is greater than the decrease in the "net scale economy" component.
Relation to Recent Studies
Our findings on the marginal welfare of increasing current subsidies in London are consistent with those of Glaister (1984) : he estimates that a uniform reduction in all London transit fares would produce net social benefits of £0.41 per £1 of subsidy; our estimate is 0.52.
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Our findings on optimal subsidies for London are somewhat higher than those of Glaister and Lewis (1978) , who found them to be about 50 to 60 percent of operating costs in their preferred case. However, they obtain widely differing results for different parameter assumptions, and it is difficult to pinpoint the source of differences with our results.
Our results are also broadly consistent with two studies of Chicago and several Australian cities, which find that although service levels are sometimes inefficiently high, fare subsidies could generally be increased with positive effects on welfare (Savage 1997; Dodgson 1986 ). Our findings of very high optimal subsidies for peak-period transit are similar to those of Van Dender and Proost (2004) for Brussels, in both cases because of the high value of reducing car traffic.
However, we do not find a case, as they do, for much higher peak fares; we are unsure of the reason for the difference, but we suspect that scale economies are somewhat more important in our model than theirs.
Our results contrast with those of Winston and Shirley (1998), who find optimal subsidies to be very small; however, this is not surprising because they do not include an explicit component for scale economies and they simultaneously optimize over transit prices and auto congestion tolls, effectively eliminating externality benefits from diverting drivers onto transit. Winston and Maheshri (2007) estimate that operating the Washington rail system produces a net annual aggregate welfare loss of $195 million, not counting their adjustment for distortionary tax finance of agency deficits. This may appear to conflict with our finding that the current subsidy should be increased on welfare grounds. However, a closer look reconciles the apparent difference.
First, Winston and Maheshri (2007) include annualized capital cost of $232 million as a subtraction from net benefits, which are not relevant to the question of whether operations should continue on the current system. Second, they use several assumptions that are different from ours: they do not include scale economies or interactions with bus transit, they measure unit operating costs as 28 percent higher than we do, and they implicitly assume that vehicle miles change in proportion to passenger miles (ε V = 1). If we run our model under these assumptions, we find optimal subsidies of 50 percent for peak rail, about the same as current subsidies, but only 21 percent for off-peak rail, well below current subsidies; thus our model would call for curtailing, while not fully eliminating, rail operations. Third, Winston and Maheshri use an ownfare demand elasticity for rail of -0.97; using our smaller assumed rail demand elasticities would roughly triple their estimated consumer surplus benefits from the rail system (by raising the measured value of service to current users), adding $564 million in benefits. Making just this adjustment and excluding capital costs turns their estimate into a net aggregate welfare gain of $600 million. This latter figure is roughly in line with the findings of Nelson et al. (2007) , based on a transport network model; they estimate that the Washington rail system produces an aggregate annual welfare gain of more than $700 million. 
Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that today's substantial operating subsidies for transit systems appear to be warranted on efficiency grounds, at least for the three major metropolitan areas studied. The main caveat is that this leaves aside the possibility that some of the subsidy may be lost to inefficiency or hijacked by labor unions. Thus, our analysis is most applicable to a transit agency with incentives to achieve the "best-practice" cost level; policies that might promote such cost minimization have been discussed extensively elsewhere (e.g., Wachs 1989; Winston and Shirley 1998).
Another caveat is that we have not incorporated the burden on the broader tax system from the need to finance agencies' operating deficits. To the extent that distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy, such as income taxes, are higher than they would otherwise be, this causes efficiency losses-for example, by deterring work effort. On the other hand, lower transportation and commuting costs can stimulate more economic activity and labor force participation at the margin (Parry and Bento 2001) .
Suppose, for simplicity, that the rest of the tax system is collapsed into a single tax rate on labor income. In this case the optimal externality tax or subsidy is given by the Pigouvian 19 Nelson et al. (2007) exclude scale economies, but their savings in congestion costs are larger than both ours and Winston and Maheshri's because they include parking search costs. tax/subsidy divided by the marginal cost of public funds (Bovenberg and Goulder 2002) , assuming the policy is revenue neutral and the priced good or service is an average substitute for leisure compared with other goods. The latter assumption seems a plausible approximation, at least for the bulk of transit travel, which occurs during a peak commuting period. A typical estimate for the marginal cost of public funds (which depends on the uncompensated labor supply elasticity) is around 1.1 to 1.2; making this adjustment for fiscal considerations would therefore imply some scaling back of the optimal subsidies calculated above, but not enough to overturn the basic finding that large subsidies are still warranted.
We have also ignored distributional considerations. Such concerns might raise the optimal subsidy for high-density bus service, which is heavily patronized by lower-income people, and lower it for rail service, which typically benefits wealthier riders and owners of land near transit stations. Quantifying these additional adjustments is contentious, as it brings in value judgments about appropriate distributional weights; it also runs counter to the common view that distributional concerns are most efficiently addressed through the broader tax and benefit system. 
Appendix A. Analytical Derivations
Equation (10): Agency optimization over route density (D) and vehicle size (n)
Combining (1), (4), and (5), the household's indirect utility function in (7) is defined by
From the agency's point of view, (A1) can be transformed into a social utility function by substituting the various definitions and constraints of the system, namely, (2), (3), (8) Route density affects user waiting and access costs, and vehicle size affects user crowding costs and agency operating costs OC. Thus each first-order condition for optimization has two terms, and each term involves only the same i and j, so we can continue to omit the ij superscripts without ambiguity:
where w f , a D , and c l are derivatives of the functions defined in (3b), and we have used the definitions of ρ k from (6b). The partial derivatives on the right-hand sides of (A2) and (A3) can be computed using definitions (3) and (8) 
Inserting these and dividing each equation by λM yields (10).
Equation (11). Marginal welfare effects of reduction in peak-rail fare
Partially differentiating (A1) and applying (6b) gives
Totally differentiating (A1) shows that when the agency changes peak-rail price p dp dc U dp da U dp dw U dp dt U U dp
PR TAX dp dV z dp dTAX Ũ From (A2) and (A3), we obtain
PR dp dM V z dp dTAX dp dc dp da dp dw dp dt M M dp
) for j=CAR and depends on the transit agency's operating policy for j=B, R. To keep track of its parts, we write the components of (A4a) We can compute dTAX/dp PR by rearranging (9) with only TAX on the left-hand side, differentiating it, and using (2a) and (8) to get 
where the first term is changes in peak-rail revenue from existing passengers; the second is changes in fuel tax revenue; the third is changes in transit fare revenue due to mode and time-ofday shifts; the fourth is changes in transit operating cost related to travel time (divided into two parts: changes due to shifts among different modes and times of day with different average supply costs, and effects of congestion); and the last is changes in transit operating cost related to vehicle size. Note that new revenues reduce the lump-sum TAX that must be levied, whereas new costs increase it.
Substituting (A5b) into (A4b), we see that the terms M PR cancel, and we can rearrange the other parts into a more convenient order for further calculation, as follows: It is useful to summarize the definitions of elasticities of bus and rail travel characteristics, recalling that all are defined so as to be positive:
We also define how service frequency and route density change with vehicle miles, and how vehicle size and load factors change with occupancy, as follows:
We now proceed to compute key derivatives in (A4a) and (A5a) in terms of ≡ dM ij PR M ij /dp PR . The travel time derivative can be written, using (2a), (3a), and (A7b), as
where and . Note that by our assumption that rail speeds are unaffected by road traffic. Similarly, the waiting, access, and crowding derivatives in (A4), which apply only for j≠CAR, can be written using (2), (3), and (A7) as
We now examine the terms in (A6) in groups. We begin by using (A8b) and (A8c) to compute WAITACC as given in (A4), using (10a) to simplify:
where the last equality applies definition (12b). This accounts for all the terms in (11) involving MB scale . As for the other terms in the first group in (A6), we note that TRANSITREV, the third term in (A5a), accounts for all the terms in (11) involving p. We also see that OPSUPPLY, as defined by the first of the two terms involving K ij in (A5a), can be written using (A7b) as
where the last equality uses definition (12a). Thus OPSUPPLY accounts for all the terms in (11) involving MC supply .
We now turn to the second group of terms in (A6). The terms USERTIM and OPCONG, which are the terms in (A4a) and (A5a) involving dt ij /dp PR , can be combined and written, using 
These terms are components of sums of as defined in (12c). Next we obtain some other components of those same sums. Using the definition of ε ij ext MC V and the fact that λ=u X , the change in external costs of pollution and accidents is (A12)
Finally, the fuel tax revenue term in (A5) Finally, we consider the last group of terms in (A6), involving crowding and the costs undertaken to avoid it. Using (A7b), A7d), (A8d), and (10b), these terms add to
which accounts for the terms in (11) involving MC occ . We have now accounted for all terms in (11), which completes the proof.
Transit agency optimization over vehicle miles of service (V).
Now consider optimizing with respect to V, which we consider only for some scenarios (including the baseline scenario). We compute the optimal value of ε V under certain additional simplifying assumptions, namely these three:
• Elasticities of waiting and access times (defined positively) are all equal to a common value describing waiting and access times, respectively. Solving (A15) for f, we see that it is proportional to the square root of V. That is, f is adjusted when V changes with elasticity ε fV =½. Therefore,
We now consider maximizing with respect to V. Given our second assumption, V affects (A1) only through the terms involving waiting time w, access a, crowding c, and operator cost OC, the latter entering through budget constraint (9). The first-order condition is therefore
where the last equality uses the definitions in (6b) and (8) and the result λ=u X . Dividing by λ and using (A7), (2a), and (10), this implies
Under our second assumption, the right-hand side of (A17) is a constant as far as the agency is concerned. On the left-hand side, . Therefore,
Now let M change parametrically, with all the service variables f, n, and V changing in response.
Differentiating the logarithm of (A18) with respect to log(M) yields
Substituting (A16) into (A19) and solving yields ε V =2/(2+ζ). For the common case ζ=1, this yields ε V =2/3, as in Small (2004) and a special case of Nash (1988) .
The intuition for this result is somewhat subtle. If ζ is near zero, wait and access costs are relatively unaffected by vehicle miles of service, so vehicles are operated only as necessary to handle the passenger loads; thus increased passenger loads require a proportional increase in vehicle miles, i.e. ε V =1. If ζ is large, the operator accounts for the substantial effects on user costs by running extra vehicles for passengers' convenience even when M is small; in that case, when M increases, the operator can absorb some of the increase through higher occupancy, thereby reaping more of the advantages of scale; this means choosing a smaller value of ε V . We take ζ=1 as our base case (ε V =2/3) and consider sensitivity ζ∈[0,2] by treating ε V =1 and ε V =½.
Appendix B. Assessment of Parameter Values
Here we describe our methodology for estimating parameter values along with data sources; Table 2 , which is discussed in the text, summarizes our key estimates. For some parameters, breakdowns by mode or time of day are unavailable from statistical sources; in these cases we use various estimation procedures or our own judgment. U.K. monetary numbers are converted to U.S. dollars using the average 1998-2003 exchange rate of £1.0 = US$1.6.
System aggregates. Basic data are compiled from the operating agencies and various national statistics. 20 For London, we allocate total passenger miles across time of day using the observed fraction of passenger trips occurring at peak period, 0.62 for rail and 0.48 for bus, and an assumed average trip length in the peak equal to 1.6 times that in the off-peak. 21 Passenger miles per hour are then computed assuming that the peak period covers 6 hours per workday (30 hours per week) and the off-peak covers 10 hours every day (70 hours per week). We assume peak shares are each 0.05 higher for Washington (which has a high proportion of government employment) and 0.05 lower for Los Angeles (which has a smaller discrepancy between peak and off-peak vehicles per hour). 22 To obtain vehicle miles per hour, we assume that observed total vehicle miles are allocated in proportion to their respective passenger miles per hour to the power ε V =0.67, our baseline assumption as discussed in Appendix A. Table 10 ); however, we expect a smaller discrepancy for transit trips because of the high fixed time cost of accessing transit. 22 The Washington adjustments are in line with unpublished statistics we obtained from transit agency representatives; the Los Angeles transit authority has no such data on trips by time of day.
23 Total vehicle miles for rail were obtained by multiplying vehicle-car miles by average cars per train; for peak periods the latter is calculated by the ratio of rail cars to trains. Off-peak train length is assumed to be slightly lower based on common observation.
Operating costs and fares. We assume that vehicle capital costs are proportional to capacity n, whereas other operating costs are independent of n. Thus in aggregate, vehicle capital costs constitute k 1 tV and other operating costs k 2 ntV, using (8). Operating costs, aside from vehicle capital costs, are taken from the operating statistics of the transit agencies. For rail, we assume that 10 percent of these are the fixed cost of maintaining stations ( iR F in (8a)). When expressed per vehicle hour of service, we assume that the rest of these costs are 25 percent greater during peak than off-peak periods because of difficulties in scheduling labor for split shifts; hence we obtain in (8b).
As for vehicle capital costs, we estimate them ourselves by annualizing the purchase cost of a rail or bus car, assuming lifetimes of 25 and 12 years, respectively, and a real interest rate of 7 percent. 24 We allocate vehicle capital costs entirely to the peak period, on the assumption that any increase in vehicle miles in that period requires purchasing more vehicles, whereas an increase in the off-peak period does not; hence we obtain and = 0 in (8b). Vehicle capital costs are 27 to 52 percent of other peak variable operating costs. Thus our assumption that they are the portion of costs that is proportional to n leads to results consistent with several other studies of size-related costs, as reviewed by Small (2004, 156 and note 13) .
Fares were obtained by dividing agency passenger fare revenue by passenger mileage (for Washington rail, peak fares were higher than off-peak in 2002, but the discrepancy was modest and we ignore it).
Wait costs. Based on evidence summarized in Small (1992, 44) , we assume the value per minute of in-vehicle time ρ T is 0.5 and 0.375 times the median gross wage rate for peak and off-peak periods, respectively; hourly wages are taken to be $16.93, $14.19, and $12.06 The access-time elasticity depends on route density in a manner similar to how the wait-time elasticity depends on service frequency. It is one if people live at uniformly distributed locations and walk to the nearest transit stop, and smaller if people living farther away choose a faster access mode with a fixed cost (e.g., park and ride). The less dense the transit network, the more important these other access modes, so the lower the elasticity. We assume other access modes have minor importance in London but more in Washington and more still in Los Angeles, and so choose = 0.8, 0.65 and 0.5 for these cities, respectively. Those assumptions lead to the values shown in Table 2 . The fraction of extra transit trips from increased travel demand is a residual, equal to between zero and 20 percent. The review by Pratt et al. (2000) suggests that 10 percent and 26 percent of new transit trips in Los Angeles and Atlanta, respectively, represented some combination of changes in walking, trip frequency, and destination during the 1990s; given the likely further decline in this fraction due to metropolitan decentralization, this evidence is roughly consistent with our assumed values.
Little information is available about shifts of transit riders across time periods. We assume that in each case, 10 percent of the change in transit ridership represents such shifts, and that the shifts occur entirely to the same transit mode.
For London, we expect less diversion to automobile and more to the other transit mode because of the smaller initial share of automobiles and travelers' more extensive transit choices.
We therefore set London's diversion ratios to be like those for Washington, except 0.20 smaller for auto in the same time period, and 0.20 larger for other transit in the same time period.
cars. We assume that Washington is like Atlanta, and that peak values are 0.05 higher, and 
